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Current research in Intercultural Information Ethics 
(IIE) is preoccupied, almost exclusively, by moral 
and political issues concerning the right and the just 
(e.g., Hongladarom & Ess 2007; Ess 2008; Capurro 
2008). For example, researchers in the field have 
paid special attentions to privacy (e.g., Ess 2005; Lü 
2005; Kitiyadisai 2005; Nakada & Tamura 2005; 
Capurro 2005; Hongladarom 2007), intellectual 
property rights (e.g., Burk 2007), freedom of infor-
mation (e.g., Rooksby & Weckert 2007), etc. These 
problems are undeniably important, and with the 
continuing development and diffusion of ICTs, we 
can only be sure more moral and political problems 
of similar kinds are going to emerge in the future. 
Yet, as important as those problems are, I want to 
argue that researchers‘ preoccupation with the right 
and the just are undesirable. I shall argue that IIE 
has thus far overlooked the issues pertaining to the 
good life (or, individual‘s well-being). IIE, I claim, 
should also take into account these issues. Hence, I 
want to propose a new agenda for IIE, i.e. the good 
life, in the current paper. 
In the first section, I will diagnose the reasons for 
the negligence of the good life in IIE. Particularly, I 
will point out that specific understandings of ethical 
pluralism and subjectivity of the good life may lead 
researchers in IIE to neglect the issues pertaining to 
the good life. In the second section, I will demon-
strate the importance of the good life in IIE. Firstly, 
I will argue that the good life is inherently connect-
ed to the right and the just, and therefore it cannot 
be ignored by researchers who are interested in the 
right and the just. Secondly, I will argue that fram-
ing IIE in terms of ‗moral problems‘ and/or ‗political 
problems‘ have an undesirable distorting effect. The 
scope of IIE, I will argue, can be broadened to 
include other important ethical issues by introducing 
the good life into the field. Finally, I shall end this 
paper by proposing some directions for future 
research. 
The 'Good Life' in Intercultural 
Information Ethics 
Charles Taylor has claimed that contemporary moral 
philosophy ―tended to focus on what is right to do 
rather than on what is good to be, on defining the 
content of obligation rather than the nature of the 
good life‖, and, thus, he lamented that contempo-
rary moral philosophy has become ―cramped and 
truncated.‖1 Similarly, Axel Honneth has recently 
noted that 
―In the last three decades, social criticism has 
essentially limited itself to evaluating the norma-
tive order of societies according to whether they 
fulfill certain principles of justice. Despite the 
success of this approach […], this approach has 
lost sight of the fact that a society can demon-
strate a moral deficit without violating generally 
valid principles of justice.2 
Honneth termed the questions left out by social 
criticism ―ethical‖ questions, which are about what is 
―desirable beyond all consideration of what is just‖.3 
In other words, both Taylor and Honneth have 
pointed to an existing gap in contemporary moral 
philosophy and social criticism (or political philoso-
phy). What goes beyond the right for Taylor and the 
just for Honneth is precisely the issues pertaining to 
the good life. The issues, which are currently left 
out, can be succinctly captured by the question: 
‗How should I live?‘4 
Whether Taylor‘s characterisation of contemporary 
moral philosophy and Honneth‘s report of the cur-
rent state of social criticism (or political philosophy) 
are true in general, I think, they have accurately 
described the current research in IIE. Researchers in 
IIE have thus far been shied away from topics 
beyond what is right and what is just. As a result, I 
think, the scope of IIE has become unnecessarily 
limited. In the following section, I will diagnose the 
main reasons behind the reluctance to incorporate 
the good life in IIE. 
Intercultural Information Ethics and the Minimal 
Moral Denominator 
Elsewhere, I have attempted to show that the aim 
of current research in IIE is to establish the minimal 
moral denominator (MMD), i.e. a set of basic norms 
and/or normative principles for ethical and political 
                                               
1  Taylor, Charles: Sources of the Self. 3 
2  Honneth, Axel, Reification. 84 
3  Ibid 
4  Usually, the question: ‘How should I live?‘ is being used in 
contrasting the right, i.e. morality in the narrow sense, with 
the good, i.e. morality in the broad sense. (Williams 1985) It 
is less often to be used in contrasting the the just with the 
good because the question is individualistically phrased with 
‘I‘. To overcome the individualistic bias, I think, one may re-
phrase the question into ‘how should a group of individuals, 
e.g., citizens, live?‘ 
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issues which is potentially acceptable by ‗all‘ ethical 
and cultural traditions.5 (Wong 2009) Understanding 
the aim of IIE to be to establish MMD has a natural 
tendency to exclude the issues pertaining to the 
good life because MMD is ill-suited to answer the 
issues.  
I have argued that for MMD to be potentially ac-
ceptable by all ethical and cultural traditions, it must 
be either open or thin, that is – it is either vague 
and/or ambiguous enough for multiple interpreta-
tions, or it is only procedurally justified but not 
substantively justified. Yet, it is precisely the open-
ness and/or thinness of MMD that make it unsuita-
ble for answering the issues pertaining to the good 
life. Answering the question: ‗How should I live?‘ 
normatively requires researchers to offer positive 
recommendation to individuals. It requires research-
ers to determine, for example, whether an ICT or 
ICTs-related activities is good for the individuals 
and, thus, they should have/use/engage with it.  
Yet, MMD, characterised by openness or thinness, is 
essentially agnostic to positive recommendation. For 
instance, while MMD‘s openness allows multiple 
interpretations of norms and/or normative principles 
to be valid, it also strips away MMD‘s ability to 
determine which interpretation is superior. More 
importantly, because of the openness of norms and 
normative principles, MMD cannot non-arbitrarily 
demonstrate that one positive recommendation is 
better than another. The same is true of MMD‘s 
thinness. Procedural justification is fit to delimit 
behaviours and social practices, but it suffers from 
the difficulty to offer positive recommendation. A 
reasonable procedural justification can tell us what 
we should not do by ruling out behaviours and social 
practices with procedures that are accepted by 
individuals who are minimally rational and by ethical 
and cultural traditions which satisfy some criteria of 
reasonableness. In other words, so long as the 
behaviours and social practices are not ruled out by 
the procedures, they are permissible. However, the 
procedures in themselves do not offer any criteria or 
mechanisms to distinguish the goodness of various 
behaviours and social practices. 
                                               
5  To say that the minimal moral denominator (MMD) has to be 
potentially acceptable by all ethical and cultural traditions is 
oversimplified and naïve. Instead of all ethical and cultural 
traditions, MMD is sufficient if it is potentially acceptable by 
all reasonable ethical and cultural traditions. So construed, 
however, it implies that a proper and complete formulation of 
MMD requires a prior account of reasonableness (of ethical 
and cultural traditions). To avoid further complexities of defin-
ing reasonableness, I shall only use the simplistic and naïve 
formulation of MMD in the current paper. 
To sum up: I have argued elsewhere that the aim of 
current research in IIE is to establish MMD, which is 
characteristically open and/or thin. The openness 
and thinness of MMD, in turns, make it difficult to 
include the good life into IIE because the issues 
pertaining to the good life are out of reach for MMD. 
Putting the Good Life Aside: Pluralism and 
Subjectivity 
Still, it is worth pondering why researchers in IIE 
have focused on MMD. There are, I think, two 
closely related presumptions held by researchers in 
IIE, each of them has made it difficult for the good 
life to enter in IIE. Since there are few discussions 
on the place of the good life in IIE, this section will 
be largely speculative.6 Here, I shall outline the two 
presumptions, i.e. ethical pluralism and subjectivity 
of the good life, and explain how specific under-
standings of them may lead to the omission of the 
good life in IIE.  
As Ess (e.g., 2006, 2007) has argued convincingly, 
ethical pluralism should be at the core of IIE. Here, 
ethical pluralism refers to the view that there are 
different, but equally legitimate ethical and cultural 
traditions in the world. And, it is the recognition of 
the truth of ethical pluralism that motivates research 
in IIE. In recognising the legitimacy of other ethical 
and cultural traditions, one cannot impose the 
normative standard of their own tradition to people 
of other traditions without, at the same time, being 
guilty of ethical-cultural imperialism. Despite its 
importance to IIE, specific understanding of ethical 
pluralism, I suspect, may be responsible for the 
exclusion of the good life in IIE. 
The specific understanding of ethical pluralism in 
question is best captured by John Rawls‘s ―fact of 
reasonable pluralism‖, which stated that we are 
living in a world characterised by ―a pluralism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines [and, more importantly,] a pluralism of 
incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines.‖7 Rawls stated that a comprehensive doctrine 
includes ―conceptions of what is of value in human 
                                               
6  A notable exception is Brey (2007a). Brey has discussed the 
differences in various value systems and noted that Eastern 
cultures, e.g., Confucian and/or Buddhist cultures, exhibit 
different views of the good life. Another exception is, Bynum‘s 
(2006) ‗Flourishing Ethics‘, in which the good (or, in Bynum‘s 
terms, flourishing) plays a central role. While Flourishing Eth-
ics is not developed explicitly for IIE, it can be extended to 
IIE. (See, e.g., Ess 2007) 
7  Rawls, John: Political Liberalism. xvi; my emphasis.  
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life, and ideals of personal character, as well as 
ideals of friendship and of familial and associational 
relationships, and much else that is to inform our 
conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.‖8 In 
short, it is people‘s comprehensive doctrine which 
informs them how they should live.  
In Rawls‘s view, the goal of political philosophy is to 
achieve an overlapping consensus. Since reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines can be incompatible, they 
have to be set aside. Comprehensive doctrines, 
thus, are being excluded from political philosophy; 
and, relatedly, because answers to the question: 
‗How should I live?‘ are based on people‘s compre-
hensive doctrine; the question, therefore, is not a 
legitimate consideration in political philosophy, too. 
Accordingly, one can discern a sharp distinction 
between the right (and the just) and the good in 
Rawlsian ethical pluralism. Understanding ethical 
pluralism in the Rawlsian way, thus, naturally ex-
cludes the issues pertaining to the good life because 
they are not regarded as the proper subjects to 
political philosophy. While Ess‘s own view of ethical 
pluralism strives to overcome the deficiency of 
Rawlsian ethical pluralism by reintroducing ethical 
and cultural traditions into IIE, his view resembles 
Rawlsian ethical pluralism with its primary emphasis 
on the right (and the just).9 
A related presumption that leads researchers to 
exclude the issues pertaining to the good life, I 
think, is the view that the good life is subjective. 
This presumption ties closely to the liberal view of 
person as autonomous and rational being. According 
to this view, individuals are self-determining and 
self-responsible for their life project, and they are 
themselves also the only persons who have authori-
ty over their choices. The view also states that 
individuals are capable of pursuing their life project 
via means that are most suitable and efficient to 
them. Together, this view of person asserts the 
individuals themselves are the only and the best 
persons with respect to the issues pertaining to their 
lives. Hence, no inference on their choices of life 
project is justifiable.  
                                               
8  Ibid. 13 
9   Ess, in his recent works (e.g., Ess 2010), has duly noted the 
importance of the good life in IIE from a virtue ethics ap-
proach. While Ess‘s attempt is admirable, his discussions of 
IIE remain mostly about the issues on the right and the just. 
In this way, although the virtue ethics approach has given 
more attentions to the good, the good still appears to sub-
sume under the right and the just. 
In line with the liberal view of person, the issues 
pertaining to the good life are out of reach from 
moral and political philosophy. Because of the 
alleged subjectivity of the good life, it is, therefore, 
difficult for the researchers in IIE, who hold a broad-
ly liberal view of person, to incorporate the good life 
into their ethical and political reflections.  
Of course, the liberal view of person and the subjec-
tivity of the good life are not unquestioned in moral 
and political philosophy.10 And, indeed, researchers 
in IIE have explicitly argued for alternatives to the 
liberal view of person (e.g. Hongladarom, 2007). 
However, the effort is put mainly to argue for the 
compatibility of the alternatives to the liberal view of 
person. In this way, the issues pertaining to the 
good life are deemed unimportant. 
The Good Life, Why? 
In the previous section, I have postulate why issues 
pertaining to the good life have been excluded in 
IIE. In this section, I want to offer two claims for 
including the good life in IIE. My first claim looks at 
the relationship between the good life, the right and 
the just, and my second claim focuses on the ad-
vantages of incorporating the good life in IIE.   
The Good Life, the Right and the Just 
The omission of the good life in current research in 
IIE, as I have attempted to demonstrated, is a result 
of the sharp distinction between the right/the just 
and the good. The separation of the right/the just 
from the good is, in my view, unwarranted. As Keller 
(2009) has rightly pointed out, the distinction be-
tween the right/the just and the good is merely 
technical: It does not accord to our pre-theoretical 
intuition. He has also rightly noted that one‘s theory 
of the good will always play a central role in their 
theory of the right. Consider, for example, Rawls‘s 
theory of justice (or, any Rawlsian theory of justice), 
which is dependent on the notion of primary goods; 
Rawls‘s theory of justice is applicable only if a prior 
list of primary goods is provided. In other words, if 
we understand ‗the good life‘ as the basic, funda-
mental components for individuals to live a good 
life, then the distinction between the right/the just 
and the good will simply collapse. 
                                               
10  For an overview, see Wall (2008) and Christman (2009). 
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Yet, researchers in IIE may question the aforemen-
tioned claim and state that what is at stake is only 
terminological. Indeed, they can agree entirely with 
the claim that ‗the good life‘ is important to IIE 
insofar as it is regarded as the basic, fundamental 
components for individuals to live a good life, but, at 
the same time, point out that it adds nothing new to 
the debate. They may continue to state that the 
issues have already been taken care of in terms of 
‗the right‘ and ‗the just‘, namely if privacy is the 
basic, fundamental components for individuals to 
live a good life, then IIE have already discussed the 
privacy-related problem extensively. Similarly, moral 
and political problems arise from intellectual proper-
ty rights, freedom of information, etc. are also 
widely discussed by researchers in IIE. In other 
words, researchers in IIE have already taken up the 
issues, albeit in different terminologies. 
I think the complaint is reasonable. It is, indeed, 
true that privacy, intellectual property rights, free-
dom of information, etc. are central topics in IIE. 
Yet, I think, reconceptualising IIE in terms of the 
good life (in the aforementioned sense) can act as a 
heuristic device to counter the tendency of reflecting 
in terms of MMD. Unlike MMD, which aims at delim-
iting behaviours and social practices, ‗the good life‘ 
is positive, i.e. it identifies what individuals should 
have/use/engage with. Hence, it facilitates ethical-
political reflections beyond the right and the just. 
Intercultural Information Ethics and Ameliorative 
Aspects of ICTs 
Besides, the current research in IIE too often focus-
es on the moral and political problems emerge from 
the development and diffusion of ICTs. The empha-
sis on ‗problems‘, I think, has created an unfortu-
nate impression that ICTs are merely sources of 
moral and political disruption. Despite the moral and 
political challenges brought by ICTs and ICTs-
related activities, we can hardly deny that ICTs are 
also beneficial to individuals, too. By framing IIE in 
terms of moral and political problems, researchers in 
IIE have left out a series of important issues. For 
example, the Internet, particularly the Social Net-
working Sites (SNS), has enabled non-face-to-face 
intimate relationships (e.g. Briggle 2008). Whether 
this new form of intimate relationship is good for 
individuals of different ethical and cultural traditions 
has remained unexplored. Similarly, individuals‘ 
(self-) presentation on the Internet has enormous 
impacts on their life, and the impacts are clearly 
dependent on the ethical and cultural traditions of 
the individuals.11 The issue of what the better (self-) 
presentation is in and for different ethical and 
cultural traditions is indispensible to answer the 
question: ‗How should I live?‘ 
These questions are distinct from moral and political 
problems in that they are not moral and political 
problems per se. They have to do with ―the best 
thing to do‖, whereas in moral and political philoso-
phy the problems are centred on rightness and 
justice. A failure to do the best thing does not make 
a person wrong or unjust (at least, not ―wrong‖ in 
the moral sense). Hence, they are not about permis-
sibility, but about amelioration. In other words, they 
are about improving one‘s life by better uses of ICTs 
and engagements with ICTs-related activities. By 
incorporating the ameliorative questions into IIE, 
researchers can go beyond MMD and offer positive 
recommendation to individuals. 
Concluding Remarks: Future 
Research 
I have argued in this paper that the issues pertain-
ing to the good life have thus far been neglected by 
researchers in IIE. I have also argued that the 
negligence is a result of the aim of IIE to be to 
establish MMD. Finally, I have pointed out that 
researchers in IIE have no reasons to shy away 
from issues pertaining to the good life because (i) 
there is no sharp distinction between the good and 
the right/the just, and (ii) ameliorative questions of 
ICTs and ICTs-related activities require inter-/cross-
cultural investigation, too. 
As Brey (2007b) has pointed out, researchers in 
Information Ethics have only recently begun to look 
beyond the right and the just. He has also noted 
that different theoretical framework(s) is required 
for investigating issues pertaining to the good life. 
The same is true for investigating the good life in 
inter-/cross-cultural settings. So far, researchers in 
IIE have restricted themselves to moral theories, 
e.g. deontology, consequentialism and virtue-based 
ethics. These theories are helpful insofar as we 
regard ‗the good life‘ as the basic, fundamental 
components for living; but they are unhelpful when 
we seek to answer the ameliorative questions.12 In 
                                               
11  The point is similar to Weckert‘s discussion of offense in 
Weckert (2007). 
12  Consequentialism is, perhaps, an exception because it 
equates the good with the right/the just. 
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order to answer the ameliorative questions, we need 
to know what is good for ‗us‘. In other words, we 
need a theory of the good life (or well-being), which 
tells us what we should strive for. 
In the West, philosophers have elaborated three 
major theories of the good life, i.e. hedonism, desire 
theories and objective-list theories.13 These theories 
allow researchers in Information Ethics to evaluate 
the impacts of ICTs and ICTs-related activities on 
individual‘s well-being; and, also allow them to offer 
positive recommendation based on the theories of 
the good life they maintain. Unfortunately, there are 
relatively few contemporary philosophical studies on 
the non-Western theories of the good life. Hence, to 
embark on the new agenda of IIE, the first step is to 
systematically investigate the non-Western theories 
of the good life. Once the non-Western theories of 
the good life are elaborated, researchers in IIE can 
begin to compare and contrast how different ethical 
and cultural traditions perceive the impacts of ICTs 
and ICTs-related activities on the good life. Re-
searchers in IIE, then, will be better equipped to 
offer positive recommendation with respect to the 
good life in inter-/cross-cultural settings. 
The future IIE, therefore, should consist of two 
parallel strands. The first strand, which has already 
existed in IIE, focuses on the moral and political 
problems emerging from the development and 
diffusion of ICTs. The second strand, then, aims at 
the ameliorative aspects of ICTs and ICTs-related 
activities. Among other things, IIE of the good life 
investigates theories of the good life of different 
ethical and cultural traditions; and it attempts to 
improve individual‘s well-being in inter-/cross-
cultural settings.14  
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